In this paper I argue-against van Fraassen's constructive empiricism-that the practice of saving phenomena is much broader than usually thought, and includes unobservable phenomena as well as observable ones. My argument turns on the distinction between data and phenomena: I discuss how unobservable phenomena manifest themselves in data models and how theoretical models able to save them are chosen. I present a paradigmatic case study taken from the history of particle physics to illustrate my argument. The first aim of this paper is to draw attention to the experimental practice of saving unobservable phenomena, which philosophers have overlooked for too long. The second aim is to explore some far-reaching implications this practice may have for the debate on scientific realism and constructive empiricism.
Introduction
In The Scientific Image ([1980] ) Bas van Fraassen challenges scientific realism. On his constructive empiricist view, science aims to save observable phenomena, not to give a literally true story of what the world is like. Accepting a theory implies believing that the theory is empirically adequate, i.e. that it is true with respect to the observable phenomena. And, from an empiricist perspective, observable phenomena are the phenomena observable-to-us as human beings whose sensory apparatus has inherent limitations. Thus, the moons of Jupiter are observable because astronauts can see them, as can astronomers looking through a telescope, whereas micro-particles detected in a cloud chamber are unobservable because no unaided observation of them will ever be possible (van Fraassen [1980] , pp. 16-7). This observable/unobservable distinction has been one of the most thought-provoking ideas, and an inexhaustible source of discussions in the past 25 years (see Churchland and Hooker [1985] ; for a more recent debate, see Ladyman [2000] ; Monton and van Fraassen [2003] ; Muller [2005] ).
In the debate that followed the publication of The Scientific Image, van Fraassen clarified that the range of observable phenomena extends well beyond the realm of sense data to include also data models as 'the dress in which the debutante phenomena make their debut ' (van Fraassen [1985] , p. 269). In his most recent book, The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen has returned to the issue of theoretical models saving phenomena as they appear in data models, in order to criticize once again the realist's tendency to introduce surreptitiously theoretical quantities. It is worth quoting van Fraassen on this point in some detail:
The framing and investigating of hypotheses, which will stand or fall depending on their fit (in various ways) to these data models, will be equally constrained in terms of admissible quantities. But these hypotheses may include quantities not used in the construction of data models. Is there more to this than a simple addition? The newly introduced theoretical quantities soon begin to affect the very structure and content of observation reports. [. . .] Clearly we have here an exceedingly subtle subject for philosophical study. To put it very briefly: the theoretical models (proffered, by means of those hypotheses, as candidates for the representation of the phenomena) are confronted by the data models. Here nature, indeed, natural selection, takes its rightful toll, for fit to those data models is ultimately the bottom line.
What are the constraints on the introduction of new parameters when theoretical models [. . .] are constructed? At the most fundamental level (introduction of a new fundamental physical theory) I really do not know how to characterise them. That there must be such constraints closely tied to the immediately preceding history of the subject, and to connections between the new models and the older ones, I am convinced. Quarks and superstrings are admissible at stages where demonic intervention would not be. Closer to home, in the less fundamental sciences, we see one obvious constraint: the new parameters should belong to an accepted theory with a wider domain (van Fraassen [2002] , pp. 163-4).
In this paper I investigate the process of construction of data models in particle physics, and explore the nature of the constraints underlying the introduction of new theoretical quantities at the most fundamental level (i.e. in the quark theory). In van Fraassen's words, this is an exceedingly subtle subject for philosophy, and what I offer is only a tentative analysis. It will hopefully raise some questions for an empiricist to ponder. The conclusions should be read as a preliminary contribution to a still largely unexplored area.
To this end I present in some detail the discovery of the J/ψ particle in November 1974. The new phenomenon 'made its debut' in the dress of two data models-due respectively to Burton Richter and Samuel Ting, who both were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1976 for this discovery. Despite different inputs, outputs, and experimental procedures, the two data models ended up spotting the same new phenomenon, namely a very narrow resonance at 3.1 GeV. From among rival theoretical models proposed at that time, only Appelquist-Politzer's theoretical model turned out to save the new phenomenon. The model implied the introduction of a new theoretical quantity, that is, a fourth quark carrying a new flavour (charm).
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to advertise the widely neglected fact that often in science what make their debut in data models are unobservable phenomena. Saving phenomena is an interest-driven practice that cuts across the distinction between observable and unobservable phenomena: the phenomena scientists may want or need to save go well beyond the restricted realm of observable phenomena. The first aim of this paper is then to extend the relationship between theoretical models and data models that van Fraassen envisages for observable phenomena to unobservable phenomena too, so as to do justice to some important experimental practices that have been for too long overlooked or neglected by philosophers. Once we enlarge the class of salvageable phenomena to include unobservable ones, new light is cast on the relationship between phenomena and theoretical entities. The second aim of this paper is to draw philosophers' attention to the scientific practice of saving unobservable phenomena and in this way to explore some far-reaching philosophical implications this practice has for reassessing the debate between scientific realists and antirealists.
The structure of the paper reflects this twofold aim. In Section 2, I clarify what a data model is according to van Fraassen (Section 2.2), and then show how unobservable phenomena can make their debut in it (Section 2.3). My argument hinges on a crucial distinction between data and phenomena due to Bogen and Woodward (Section 2.1). In Section 3, I offer an exemplar of the practice of saving unobservable phenomena to bridge the gap between the allegedly rock-bottom empirical ground of data models on the one hand, and theoretical quantities surreptitiously introduced in theoretical models on the other hand. I show that theoretical quantities enter at different levels in the process of saving unobservable phenomena, and contribute to make this process feasible. The exemplar is based upon the historical case study of the discovery of the J/ψ particle, which I reconstruct in Section 4. In the concluding remarks of Section 5, I foreshadow some far-reaching philosophical implications of the practice of saving unobservable phenomena, in order to give a new twist to the current standoff between scientific realism and constructive empiricism.
Unobservable Phenomena

Data and phenomena
In the philosophy of science literature there is a deeply rooted tendency to regard phenomena as images of reality. Phenomena mark the threshold of what is real, like the shadows on the wall in the Platonic myth of The Republic. Empiricists and realists typically diverge as to whether the prisoners, who according to the Platonic myth are sitting in chains and observing the shadows on the wall, can free themselves and look at the real objects that cast the shadows (as realists contend), or they are instead bound to never have access to the real objects and hence content themselves with their shadows (as constructive empiricists claim instead). Observable phenomena have become the hallmark of empiricism and the threshold beyond which the elusive realm of unobservable entities-dear to scientific realists-begins.
Despite the attractiveness, this picture fails to capture the increasing variety of phenomena that have proved in fact salvageable in science. A closer look at the wide family of experimental practices will soon reveal that phenomena are not necessarily pale images of reality, nor are they necessarily observable. My argument turns on an important distinction originally drawn by Bogen and Woodward ([1988] ), namely, the distinction between data and phenomena (this pioneering article has given rise to a debate about data and phenomena, see McAllister [1997] ; Glymour [2000] ). As Bogen and Woodward point out, data provide evidence for the existence of phenomena. On the other hand, 'phenomena are detected through the use of data, but in most cases are not observable in any interesting sense of the term. Examples of data include bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors [. . .] . Examples of phenomena, for which the above data might provide evidence, include weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton' (Bogen and Woodward [1988] , p. 306). More precisely, data are 'idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts, and typically cannot occur outside of those contexts [. . .] . Phenomena, by contrast, are not idiosyncratic to specific experimental contexts. We expect phenomena to have stable, repeatable characteristics which will be detectable by means of a variety of different procedures, which may yield quite different kinds of data ' (ibid., p. 317) . This feature of data-their being idiosyncratic to specific experimental contexts-is closely tied to another important feature: data must occur in the form of records of occurrences that are accessible to our sensory apparatus. But this may well involve a long causal chain and it may also require a great deal of subtle contrivance, both in the experimental setups and in the statistical techniques of data analysis and data reduction. In other words, data are records that are visually detectable (ibid., p. 320). By contrast, phenomena do not necessarily have to occur in a form that is accessible to our perception. As Bogen and Woodward note:
For the most part, phenomena cannot be perceived and, in many cases, the justification of claims about the existence of phenomena does not turn, to any great extent, on facts about the operation of the human perceptual system. Nonetheless, we are justified in believing claims about phenomena as long as data are available which constitute reliable evidence for such claims. [. . .] While we agree with van Fraassen that a successful theory should be ''empirically adequate'', we do not accept his construal of this notion. Empirical adequacy, as we understand it, means that a theory must ''save'' or ''be adequate to'' the phenomena, which for the most part are not observed, rather than the data which are observed. [. . .] It seems unlikely that van Fraassen could accept our notion of empirical adequacy without abandoning many of his most central claims. If we possess evidence and procedures which can justify belief in claims about phenomena, even though many phenomena are unobservable, it is hard to see on what grounds van Fraassen could deny that we are justified in believing as true many other typical theoretical beliefs regarding entities like atoms, electrons, and neutrinos (ibid., pp. 350-1).
Once 'empirical adequacy' is understood as the ability of a theory to 'save phenomena' broadly construed (be they observable or unobservable), new light can be cast on the relationship between phenomena and theoretical entities. The distinction between data and phenomena has indeed a crucial impact on van Fraassen's notion of empirical adequacy, and more generally on the current debate between realists and antirealists. For van Fraassen, 'saving observable phenomena' is all that science aims at doing, and going beyond observable phenomena means entering into the elusive realm of unobservable entities. Bogen and Woodward, on the other hand, by drawing attention to this important distinction between phenomena and data, have blurred the observable/unobservable dichotomy. Most importantly, they have shown that this dichotomy does not run parallel with the distinction between the empiricist realm of phenomena and the theoretical realm of unobservable entities: it rather cuts across it. However, in so doing, Bogen and Woodward's purpose was not to assimilate the latter realm to the former. They did not subscribe to the old saying that all that science aims at doing is to save the phenomena, but they instead regarded phenomena (in their own definition) as involved in a series of epistemic practices-from prediction to explanation-going well beyond the empiricist demand for saving phenomena. The phenomena Bogen and Woodward talk about are robust features that our scientific theories can predict, systematically explain, and be tested against. I want to latch onto this debate and give it a new twist.
How can phenomena that are not accessible to human perception manifest themselves? Bogen and Woodward suggest that data provide evidence for phenomena that may well be unobservable. In what follows, I shall expand on what Bogen and Woodward say, and argue that evidence for unobservable phenomena comes from data that have been selected, regimented, and laboriously organized in a data model. Once we have clarified what a data model is (Section 2.2) and how new unobservable phenomena can manifest themselves via it (Section 2.3), I hope it will become clear why there is more to saving phenomena than the empiricist claims. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, for too long philosophical debates about phenomena have fallen back on the time-honoured view of phenomena as images of reality, as some sort of Platonic shadows on the wall, a substitute for the real objects which-because unobservable-would remain empirically inaccessible and hence unwarranted from an empiricist perspective. For too long, realists have tried to respond to the empiricist's challenge by arguing that we do have some warranted ways of accessing unobservable entities (either via explanation or prediction or otherwise). But for too long realists have overlooked the possibility of counterattacking empiricists by challenging the very same concept of 'phenomenon' and the practice of 'saving phenomena'. I think modern physics prompts us not to subscribe to the Platonic view and to reconsider instead the very concept of phenomenon.
In what follows I shall suggest that phenomena are not necessarily shadows or images of something real. What follows should then not be read as an alternative to van Fraassen's account of empirical adequacy, nor as another attempt to defend traditional scientific realism. It is instead only a first, and inevitably tentative step towards a mild form of realism, a Kantian one in spirit (see Massimi [2005] , [forthcoming]). According to this mild form of realism, phenomena are neither ready-made in nature nor mere images of real objects, but they are instead objects of experience, that is, the only objects we have epistemic access to and scientific knowledge of. Interestingly enough, Kant himself distanced himself from the Platonic tradition and clearly distinguished his own position about phenomena from the Platonic one, which in his words 'took appearance and illusion to be one and the same thing' (Kant [2004] , p. 66). 1 In current scientific practice, experimental data provide evidence for phenomena, which may not necessarily be visually accessible, but may nevertheless be detected by selecting and laboriously constructing data in a data model, whose output is then 'saved' by a suitable theoretical model. 'Saving unobservable phenomena' has then a very different epistemological import from van Fraassen's 'saving observable phenomena'. It is not the claim that all that science aims at doing is to content itself with images and try to account for them. It is rather the claim that there is much more to phenomena than mere images, by contrast with what both realists and empiricists have traditionally claimed. Phenomena as objects of experience are all that we can meaningfully talk about and have scientific knowledge of. From this point of view, the practice of saving unobservable phenomena becomes the paradigmatic example of the more general practice of science. The bulk of this paper is dedicated to spelling out this slogan. But before going that far, let us take a closer look at what a data model is.
What is a data model?
The concept of data model is part of the semantic view of scientific theories. There is an important tradition of studies of data models going back to Patrick Suppes, who-as van Fraassen notes-was the first to make the point that 'theory is not confronted with raw data but with models of the data and that the construction of these data models is a sophisticated and creative process. [. . .] The whole point of having theoretical models is that they should fit the phenomena, that is, fit the models of data. [. . .] In Suppes's description, the experimentalist brings to the theoretician a small relational structure, constructed carefully from selected data ' (van Fraassen [1985] , pp. 269, 271). Building on this tradition, Bas van Fraassen has given an interesting characterization of what a data model is in the context of the methodology of theory construction, which he portrays as a two-step process:
(1) first, we widen a theoretical framework so as to allow the possibility of newly envisaged phenomena (hence ensuring empirical adequacy), and (2) we narrow it down to exclude a large class of admitted possibilities (ibid., p. 269).
1 Interestingly, Kant attributed precisely to this same Platonic tradition that equates phenomena with mere appearances the fault of granting 'reality to the intelligible beings alone' (Kant [2004] , § 32, p. 66). By taking a distance from both the realist (Platonic) position that grants reality only to things in themselves as well as from the empiricist (phenomenalist) tradition 'whereby everything would be transformed into mere appearance', Kant strikes a middle ground by introducing a brand new conception of phenomena as objects of experience, that is, as intuitions that have been subsumed under the concepts of the faculty of understanding, and that as such are the serendipitous product of both the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of understanding.
It is in step (1) that new phenomena in the dress of data models come to be embedded in theoretical models, and van Fraassen focuses on this step since it is crucial for his defence of empirical adequacy. The main idea behind this 'embedding' is that we treat phenomena as 'fragments of a ''whole'' that is much larger but orderly and simple' (ibid., p. 270), namely, as part of a much larger mathematical structure which may well include 'hidden parameters', that is, parameters that do not appear in the original 'statement of the problem' (where 'hidden' here is not necessarily synonymous with being experimentally unaccessible). On a more biographical note, van Fraassen recalls that he was prompted to develop this view of theorizing as embedding data models into theoretical models by his original studies on the philosophy of spacetime, in particular by the specific role that phase space and Hilbert space play in classical and quantum mechanics, respectively (ibid., p. 276). No wonder then that he uses foundational studies in quantum mechanics to illustrate and champion the idea of data models as being embeddable into theoretical models. If we want to have a better understanding of van Fraassen's discussion of empirical adequacy as the ability of a theory to save phenomena 'in the dress of a data model', we must take a look at his discussion of quantum mechanics. While Suppes identifies data models with small relational structures called 'empirical algebras', van Fraassen follows the quantum mechanical literature (Jauch, Piron, Marlow, Ludwig, Mielnik) in identifying data models with partially ordered sets with some operations. As an example of a partially ordered set with some operation, he presents the typical experimental case of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox and Bell's inequalities (this experimental situation is described in detail in van Fraassen [1989] ; reprinted in van Fraassen [1991] , pp. 86-7, on which I draw in what follows). Consider a source emitting two particles travelling in opposite directions towards two apparatuses L (left) and R (right), each with three possible settings or orientations that influence the outcome (e.g., L1 is the proposition that says that the left apparatus has setting 1; let us indicate settings with the indices i, j ranging over the three possible cases {1, 2, 3}). There are two possible experimental outcomes for each particle: either the particle passes the particle receiver and a red light goes on or it does not pass the particle receiver and a green light remains on. Take value 0 to correspond to 'green light' on the particle receiver, and 1 to correspond to 'red light': let us indicate these experimental outcomes with a, b ranging over {0, 1} (e.g., L30 is the proposition that says that L with setting 3 has outcome 0). An orthogonality relation holds between the probabilities of outcomes, that is, for all initial preparations, the probability of Lia and Ria, given settings Li and Ri, is zero; in other words, the particle on the L apparatus passes the barrier and a red light goes on if and only if the particle on the R apparatus does not pass the barrier and a green light remains on (and vice versa). This experimental situation exemplifies a partially ordered set with an orthogonality relation (but other kinds of relations are possible too). 2 This experimental situation can be described by a small field of propositions PR generated by ([1989] , p. 101; hence the subscript 'surface' in the formula above). Each proposition is given a certain probability depending on two things: first, information about the choice of the setting
and, second, a theory or hypothesis that gives information about how likely the outcomes a or b are for different experimental setups Li and Rj , and this takes the form of a probability function P that van Fraassen calls surface state:
Most importantly for van Fraassen, hypotheses about the surface state are testable: we choose the settings, run the experiment, observe the frequencies (how many times the red light flashes in L and R), and extrapolate from the observed frequencies the probabilities p (called surface probabilities). When we combine these surface probabilities with probability assignments to PR choice (choice weighting), we obtain a probability function on the whole field which may be called a total state. It is this mathematical structure that experimenters present to theoreticians. Thus, 'surface models', which 'are also referred to as experimental or data models' ([1991] To generalize this definition, a data model consists of two sets of observable conditions fixing a domain plus a (non-negative, real-valued) probability function on this domain. In other words, a data model expresses a functional dependence between two parameters (e.g., setting choices and possible experimental outcomes available for those setting choices). The raw data (e.g., experimental setting 1, 2, 3; and outcomes 'red light', 'green light', . . .), which should be plugged into the PRC and PRS conditions to calculate the conditional probability expressed by the P function, are observable; in particular, the 'red light', 'green light' are observed frequencies from which probabilities are extrapolated. Note, however, that they are said to be observable not because they are records of observed occurrences strictly speaking: we cannot see the particle passing the barrier of the receiver. But we can detect the occurrence of this event via the green or red light in the receiver: it is the record of the occurrence that is observable, not the occurrence itself. In sum, the raw data in this example are said to be observable because they are observable records of an otherwise detected occurrence. In this respect, van Fraassen's example falls within Bogen and Woodward's more general definition of data as visually accessible records of (observed or detected) occurrences.
Data models and unobservable phenomena
Introducing data models in the process of saving phenomena is not as innocuous a move as it seems at first sight. Paul Teller (2001) was the first to note a tension between van Fraassen's claim that the empirical substructures of theoretical models 'are to fit, not the raw data, but data models, that is models which have already regimented, organized, and in many instances idealized the phenomena as experienced' on the one hand, and 'the intuitive notion of phenomena, [. . .] the unsanitized, pre-data model descriptions of phenomena which blue-blooded empiricists should want to save', on the other hand (ibid., pp. 134-5). This tension is evident in the data models used in plate tectonics, for instance, where the phenomena to be saved are laboriously constructed descriptions of large-scale patterns of alternating weak magnetic fields detected by magnetometers dragged along behind ocean going vessels and rotated about core samples in the lab. The data outputs of the magnetometers are not represented by any part of the plate tectonic model: they are not suitable candidates for fitting eventual empirical substructures of the model. This role is rather played by the diagrams with the bands of magnetization (data model) that 'constitute the ''condensate'' of networks of interrelated theories and both mathematical and technological expertise as produced in the social enterprise of science' (ibid., p. 139). Teller concludes:
On the one hand, most such data models do not themselves represent, in the sense of being isomorphic to, anything which van Fraassen would count as phenomena. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that, at least in many cases, such data models will count as phenomena which themselves can be observed or experienced without the use of instruments (ibid., p. 139).
Van Fraassen's reply to Teller gives a new twist to the relationship between phenomena and underlying unobservable entities. Scientific instruments such as electron microscopes, spectroscopes, particle accelerators 'can be understood as not revealing what exists behind the observable phenomena, but as creating new observable phenomena to be saved ' (van Fraassen [2001] , p. 154). And once new observable phenomena are so created, the further question 'is it an image of something real?' is and remains 'a question of fact transcending the experience itself' (ibid., p. 157), and as such a nonpertinent question from an empiricist viewpoint.
I want to draw attention to an important family of data models, largely used in particle physics, where new phenomena to be saved are 'created', echoing van Fraassen. But, interestingly enough, these phenomena are not observable: they are neither perceivable, nor are the processes by which they are detected in any relevant way analogous to human vision. Moreover, by contrast with Teller's example of data models in plate tectonics that still 'count as phenomena which themselves can be observed or experienced without the use of instruments', the data models I shall describe cannot be observed or experienced without the use of instruments, namely computers using sophisticated techniques of data selection and analysis. We are justified to believe in these phenomena not because of any fact concerning our perceptual apparatus: rather, because they appear as stable and robust features (i.e., features that cannot be ascribed to background noise or to experimental error) detected through a variety of experimental procedures involving different kinds of data.
As the discussion in the preceding section aimed to highlight, the input of a data model consists of data, that is, observable records of occurrences, be they the red/green light of the particle receiver in van Fraassen's example; the magnetometer's meter readings in Teller's example; or sparks in spark chambers and Cherenkov ring-images as in my following examples. However, even if the data are observable in the sense clarified above, this does not imply that the output of a data model should be itself observable too. Van Fraassen's example already required an extrapolation from found frequencies to probabilities. In fact, often in science there is a fairly long chain between data and the final parameter that the data model is meant to measure.
In the data models I am going to present, for instance, there is a long way to go from the sparks in spark chambers of the collider SPEAR, to their being recorded by a magnetic detector, and finally statistically selected and analysed by computers into the resulting parameter that the data model measures. In other words, although the sparks resulting from particle collisions are per se observable, the relevant parameter in the data model is not obtained by just plugging in the found frequencies of sparks. To be more precise, one of the two data models I shall investigate shows how the scattering cross-section σ of a collision (measured in nanobarn) varies by varying the energy (in GeV) of the collision. To follow van Fraassen, we may give a 'surface description' of this experimental situation by using a small field of propositions PR surface concerning the outcomes of frontal collisions between two beams of particles (namely, electrons and positrons) travelling, respectively, anticlockwise on the left (L) and clockwise on the right (R) side of a collider. The experimental outcomes a range over 1, 2, 3, where 1 corresponds to the final production of jets of hadrons, 2 to the final production of electrons, and 3 to muons (in all three cases, the particle tracks can be spotted and identified thanks to a magnetic detector, as I shall clarify in Section 4.1):
Each proposition is given a certain probability depending on two things: first, information about the choice i, j of the energy setting E at which electrons and positrons are made to collide, with i, j ranging continuously, say, from 2.4 to 9 GeV
and, second, a theory that gives information about how likely the outcomes a are for different values i, j of the energy setting:
This probability function with domain part of PR surface × PR choice and range [1, 2, 3] assigns probabilities of outcomes conditional on measurement.
Consider now a new parameter R that expresses the ratio between the probability of outcome a = 1, and the probability of outcome a = 3:
This data model satisfies the two conditions that van Fraassen lays for data models, namely, their consisting of two sets of conditions fixing a domain and a function that assigns probabilities of outcomes conditional on measurement. 3 However-by contrast with van Fraassen's example-in the data model I shall consider while the raw data (sparks in spark chambers) are per se observable and so also is the condition PR choice (because we can choose the energy setting at which we want electrons and positrons to collide), the probabilities of outcomes assigned by P , and hence the ratio R, are not obtained by simply plugging in found frequencies of sparks or by extrapolating them from found frequencies. As I describe in Section 4.1, in order to know the probabilities of outcomes of electron-positron collisions, the sparks in spark chambers were connected with a magnetic detector that kept record of the curvatures of all particle tracks (produced in the collisions) in a magnetic field and could calculate their respective velocities by the number of thick steel shields they went through. The frequencies of the different types of outcomes (1, 2, and 3) per energy value could then be calculated by a computer that selected and analysed thousands of particle tracks as identified by the magnetic detector. From a constructive empiricist's point of view, we may say this process is at some distance from the raw data and there is nothing strictly speaking observable in it. Nor, accordingly, are the probabilities of outcomes observable either, as we obtain them thanks to sophisticated computer-aided techniques from the values of the electron-positron scattering cross-sections. A new unobservable phenomenon 'makes its debut' in this kind of data model in the form of an unexpected value of the probability function. As I shall clarify in the next section, the new unobservable phenomenon appeared as an unexpected value n in the ratio R, unexpected in the light of the theory that at the time gave the probabilities of outcomes p for P (Li & Rj → a|Li & Rj) = p. Namely, the unexpected value turned out to 3 A constructive empiricist cannot then defend herself by replying that the term 'data model' may be subject to slippage in its use, that is, that the expression 'data model' may be used to describe some outputs of earlier theorizing, at quite a distance beyond observation and experiment, simply because at this stage that is the relevant information to be accounted for (I thank Bas van Fraassen for pointing out this possible reply). Given the definition of data model in Section 2.2, what I have described is a data model in its own right, without any slippage in use. It is not the result of any theorizing, but rather of experimental practices that just happen to be more complex and sophisticated than other ones.
as was expected at the time. The distinctive feature of an unobservable phenomenon is that it is not idiosyncratic to the experimental context in which it originally appears, but it emerges from different contexts, namely, from other functions involving completely different parameters and data. It appears as a stable and robust feature across a variety of data models. The new unobservable phenomenon that I shall present shortly appeared indeed as an unexpected value (for the same energy value of 3.1 GeV) of the parameter R on the one hand, and of another function expressing the 'event distribution' in a completely different experiment (proton-beryllium reactions) on the other. The first data model resulted in a series of scattering graphs, where the new phenomenon manifested itself as a very narrow peak at 3.1 GeV. The second data model resulted in a histogram for the event distribution, where the phenomenon appeared once again as a narrow peak at 3.1 GeV. 4 In sum, although the input of a data model consists of observable records of occurrences, the output of a data model may well be a new phenomenon at quite a distance from the original data and not observable in any relevant sense of the term. These are the typical new phenomena particle physicists have 'created' in the past 40 years. And they are salvageable phenomena to all intents and purposes.
Saving Unobservable Phenomena: An Exemplar
The unobservable phenomenon that I describe in Section 4.1 is the result of a laborious construction involving a network of international scientific institutions, and the coordination of various technological resources, all driven by the scientific interests dominant at the time within the community of particle physicists. In this respect, it highlights an important 'constructed' element in phenomena. The phenomena that need to be saved are not only the observable ones in the blue-blooded empiricist sense: but also the unobservable ones that physicists may detect via laboriously constructed data models in a lab. Saving phenomena is an interest-driven practice that cuts across the distinction 4 We should not confuse the peak in the graph with the unexpected value of the function that it expresses. The graph with the peak is not obtained by representing in the sense of 'being isomorphic' to anything that we have observed or that is observable: it is obtained instead from some reliable data that have been reliably selected and analysed by a computer. between unobservable and observable. And once we accept that the class of salvageable phenomena is richer than usually thought, we can also start to reconsider the relationship between phenomena and theoretical entities in the process of saving phenomena.
Following up on Bogen and Woodward's remark, if we construe empirical adequacy as the ability of a theoretical model to save the phenomena, where 'phenomena' include observable and unobservable ones, it seems that we can no longer maintain some of the constructive empiricist's central claims. Namely, if we possess evidence and procedures that justify belief in unobservable phenomena, it becomes hard to deny that we can similarly be justified in believing in unobservable theoretical entities, such as electrons or quarks. One possible line of argument for this conclusion consists in showing that the inferential path that leads to unobservable phenomena is not substantially different from the inferential path that leads to theoretical entities. 5 Another possible line of argument, the one that I want to develop here, focuses on the particular way unobservable phenomena are saved, namely, how the theoretical model that is finally chosen as the empirically most adequate fits the data model where the new unobservable phenomenon appears. I want to suggest that this fit is laboriously constructed via a triadic relationship among the data model, the theoretical model, and a background scientific theory.
Here is an exemplar 6 of this relationship, patterned upon the historical episode I am going to reconstruct in the next section: (i) A background theory BT intended as a family of models M BT pre-defines the range of possible expectation values n for the ratio R that the data model is meant to measure (Section 2.3):
More precisely, BT is the theory that gives us information about how likely the outcomes a ranging over [1, 2, 3] are for different values i, j of the energy:
(ii) But the calculation of the probabilities of outcomes p (and hence of the values n of R) depends on a property of some theoretical entities to which all M BT models in various ways refer. Note that one or more of the M BT models may for instance refer to a new theoretical 5 A similar line of argument, although it does not focus on the notion of unobservable phenomena, has been defended by Peter Lipton ([1991] , pp. 175-6). Philip Kitcher ([1993] , pp. 151-5) has similarly argued that the inferential path that leads to unobserved observables is the same path that leads to unobservables.
6
As the word 'exemplar' suggests, what I am going to offer is not meant to be a unique or even privileged example of this triadic relationship among a theoretical model, a data model and a background scientific theory. It is not meant to suggest that all cases should conform to it, or that it applies to all possible cases. It is rather only an insightful and paradigmatic example of one possible (and historically realized) way of explicating this triadic relationship. entity c that may happen to be experimentally not yet discovered, but postulated by a pre-existing scientific theory T, independently introduced to account for some phenomena Y.
(iii) The data model DM reveals a new unobservable phenomenon P* in the form of an unexpected value n = 10 for the ratio R. This unexpected value may be accounted for by plugging into R certain probabilities of outcome p as predicted by some of the M BT models, say the one referring to the theoretical entity c (call it M BTc ).
(iv) Several theoretical models TM are then proposed to save the new unobservable phenomenon P*. Some of them may refer to the entity c (call them TM c ), some to other theoretical entities x (call them TM x ).
(v) Among the TM c s, some turn out to give an unsatisfactory treatment of the new phenomenon P*: that is, they may save some features of the new phenomenon but not others, and only on pain of violating some important theoretical constraints.
(vi) But one model, call it TM c *, will eventually save the new unobservable phenomenon P*: its empirical substructures fit P*. Crucially, as I am going to show below, these empirical substructures resort to the entity c, suitably featuring in TM c * without violating any relevant theoretical constraints.
(vii) Thus, TM c * saves P* because its empirical substructures fit the unexpected value n of R, where this value was predicted by probability of outcome p according to M BTc .
Saving unobservable phenomena is the result of a two-way stretching process. On the one side, the data model is devised to measure a parameter, for example, the ratio R, whose possible expectation values have been pre-defined by a family of models M BT . A new unobservable phenomenon makes its debut in the form of an unexpected measured value for R. Stretching the data model so as to fill the gap between the expected and the measured value is the first natural reaction. Data must be 'reliable': the data model must be checked so as to make sure that the unexpected value is not due to experimental errors or background noise. Should the discrepancy between the expected and the measured value prove persistent after several checks on the data model, the next step consists in stretching the available theoretical models so as to achieve an increasingly better fit with the data model. During this phase, most of the theoretical models come to be discarded.
Theoretical entities enter in this process via a two-way street. The upward path (1): they enter in the array of possible expectation values for the parameter that the data model is meant to measure, as these values are predicted by a family of models of the background theory. The downward path (2): they enter in the theoretical model from a pre-existing, independently introduced theory with a broader scope of application. Note that theoretical entities do not enter directly in the data model itself, but they do enter in the determination of the expected values for the parameter that the data model is going to measure. In other words, they enter in what van Fraassen describes as the 'hypothesis or theory which gives information about how likely the outcomes are for different sorts of experiments ' (van Fraassen [1991] , p. 87).
On the other hand, by (2), theoretical models include theoretical entities 'borrowed' so to speak from an independent scientific theory with a broader scope of application. As soon as the entity is introduced, new empirical substructures designed with its help become available to fit the unexpected measured value in the data model. Theoretical entities enter then both in the M BT model that gives the expectation value for the parameter closest to the measured value in the data model, as well as into the TM model that fits this unexpected measured value. In the following historical interlude I reconstruct how a famous unobservable phenomenon manifested itself via two different data models. This historical episode will illustrate how the exemplar here foreshadowed works out in practice.
The October Revolution of 1974: From the J /ψ to Charmonium
A new unobservable phenomenon at 3.1 GeV
In February 1973, a team of physicists guided by Burton Richter and Gerson Goldhaber was working on the electron-positron annihilations at the collider SPEAR in Stanford. In frontal electron-positron collisions, the energy released (the so-called centre-of-mass energy) 7 transforms entirely into the masses of new particles. At SPEAR, frontal collisions of electron and positron beams (with total energy ranging from 2.4 to 9 GeV) took place every few seconds in a region of the collider where a crucial new tool was installed: a magnetic detector. The magnetic detector consisted of four cylindrical and co-axial spark chambers surrounding the region where electrons and positrons collided. A series of scintillation counters surrounded the spark chambers, and they were in turn surrounded by a 3-metre wide electromagnet, outside which there was a second series of scintillation counters. The whole was wrapped in thick steel shields. On the outer shield, a final series of spark chambers was located. The multi-layer structure of the magnetic detector made it possible to record all types of particles produced in the electron-positron 7
The centre-of-mass energy is the sum of the rest masses of the interacting particles plus their kinetic energies. Depending on the nature of the collision, all or just some portion of the centre-of-mass energy transforms into the masses of the final particles that can be calculated via the laws of momentum and energy conservation.
collisions: namely, hadrons do not go beyond the steel shields because of the strong interaction with the steel atoms; electrons lose most of their energy going through the first series of spark chambers and the electromagnet; only muons can reach the outer shield and be recorded by the final series of spark chambers. These data were fed into a computer which distinguished genuine from spurious events, and could also calculate the velocity and mass of each particle depending on the time necessary to reach different layers of the magnetic detector and on the curvature of the track in the magnetic field created by the electromagnet. 8 Thanks to the magnetic detector, it was then possible to detect all types of particles produced in these collisions: either pairs of muons (µ + µ − ) or final hadronic jets were mainly produced (and, to a lesser extent, electrons). The ratio R = cross-section for e + e − → hadrons cross-section for e + e − → µ + µ − was proportional to the sum of the squared (fractional) charges of the quarks produced in the electron-positron annihilations. A measurement of R was then expected to give important information about the number and nature of quarks involved. The parameter R had previously been measured in the ADONE ring at Frascati (Italy), and then in the Cambridge Electron Accelerator (CEA) at Harvard. The early SPEAR results on R filled the gap between these two previous measurements and showed that the value of R rose smoothly from 1 to 6 by increasing the centre-of-mass energy E cm in the collisions from 2 to 5 GeV. Such a wide-ranging array of possible values for R could not discriminate between rival quark models available as of July 1974 (see Table 1 ).
9
Yet, since the known quarks at the time were only three (the u, d, and s quark) with fractional charges 2/3, −1/3, and −1/3 respectively, the expected R value was calculated as proportional to
which multiplied by a colour factor of 3 gives 2. In other words, the probability of hadronic jets as final outcomes ('events') was expected to be twice the 8 Ne'eman and Kirsh ([1986] , p. 228) recall this revolution in particle physics as follows: 'The magnetic detector system was designed and constructed by physicists from SLAC and the Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratory. [. . .] The system eliminated the need for the extremely laborious scanning and searches which characterised work on photographs of bubble chambers. In SPEAR this hard labour was assigned to a computer. [. . .] The veteran physicists who were accustomed to the arduous visual scanning took some time to adjust to the revolution. Gerson Goldhaber of Berkeley related that at first he and his colleagues used to examine each event on the screen and record it on a piece of paper, till eventually they were convinced that the computer was better at this task and that the job should be left to it'.
These correspond to what I have called the M BT models in point (ii) of the exemplar. probability of muonic jets. In the fall of 1974, Richter and Goldhaber discovered, however, that the number of hadronic events was not just twice, but hundred times higher than the number of muonic events, pointing at an unexpected value of ca. 10/3 for R (Augustin, Richter, et al. [1974] ). This unexpected value for R appeared as a very narrow peak in the scattering graphs centred at 3.1 GeV (Figure 1 ). The unobservable phenomenon that made its debut via this unexpected value in Richter's data model was a new resonance.
10 From scattering graphs
10
The old term 'resonance' goes back to Fermi's discovery of the resonance ++ . Resonances have not only well-defined masses, but also well-defined quantum numbers such as isospin, and strangeness. Despite the name, they are particles for all intents and purposes. of this kind, it is possible to know the average lifetime of the resonance:
11 it had an unexpectedly long lifetime (almost 1000 times longer than one would expect given the heavy mass of 3.1 GeV). This narrow resonance, which Richter named ψ (psi), had already been spotted-only a few days earlier-by another team of scientists guided by Samuel Ting at the Brookhaven synchrotron in Long Island (New York). Ting was working on the collision of protons against a beryllium target (p + Be → e + + e − + x ). The experiment consisted in using a proton beam extracted from the protosynchrotron, guiding it onto a beryllium target, and analysing the resultant particle tracks in a double-arm spectrometer equipped with dipole magnets and Cherenkov counters. By looking at the Cherenkov ring-images 12 of the proton-beryllium reaction, and by measuring the event distribution as a function of the invariant electron-positron mass, 13 Ting noticed that most of the electron-positron pairs so produced had energies peaked around 3.1 GeV as shown in Figure 2 . The peak was identified with a massive particle 11
By the uncertainty relations E t ≈ h/2π, the shorter the time interval t, the greater E (i.e., the range of energies for which the probability of interaction increases), where E is defined as the width at half the height of the peak.
12
The Cherenkov counters are based on the Cherenkov effect: when a charged particle with velocity v traverses a dispersive medium with a certain refractive index, the atoms in the proximity of the particle get excited and, under suitable conditions, the excitation energy is released in the form of radiation emitted at a certain angle θ to the direction of the particle motion. This angle (and then the velocity, and hence the energy of the particles) can be measured by using a mirror system that electronically constructs the so-called 'ring-images': photographs of Cherenkov rings, whose width depends on the velocity and hence on the energy of the particle, are obtained by making photons pass through a gas and drifting the photoelectrons onto a drift chamber system. The Cherenkov counters allowed in this way to distinguish electron and positron events from other hadronic events x produced in the proton-beryllium reactions. Reprinted with permission from Augustin, J. E., Richter, B. et al. (1974) 'Discovery of a narrow resonance in e + e − annihilation', Physical Review Letters 33, 1406 -1408 . Copyright (1974 by the American Physical Society.
that Ting named J . The new unobservable phenomenon manifested itself as a robust feature of Ting's data model that could not be ascribed to experimental error or background noise, as Ting pointed out:
To ensure that the observed peak is indeed a real particle (J → e + e − ) many experimental checks were made. We list seven examples: Figure 2 . Reprinted with permission from Aubert, J. J., Ting, S. et al. (1974) 'Experimental observation of a heavy particle J ', Physical Review Letters 33, 1404 -1406 . Copyright (1974 by the American Physical Society.
(1) When we decreased the magnet currents by 10%, the peak remained fixed at 3.1 GeV.
(2) To check second-order effects on the target, we increased the target thickness by a factor of 2. The yield increased by a factor of 2, not by 4.
(3) To check the pileup in the lead glass and shower counters, different runs with different voltage settings on the counters were made. No effect was observed on the yield of J.
(4) To ensure that the peak is not due to scattering from the sides of magnets, cuts were made in the data to reduce the effective aperture. No significant reduction in the J yield was found.
(5) To check the read-out system of the chambers and the triggering system of the hodoscopes, runs were made with a few planes of chambers deleted and with sections of the hodoscopes omitted from the trigger. No effect was observed on the J yield.
(6) Runs with different beam intensity were made and the yield did not change.
(7) To avoid systematic errors, half of the data were taken at each spectrometer polarity.
These and many other checks convinced us that we have observed a real massive particle J → e + e − . (Aubert, Ting, et al. [1974 ], p. 1405 Despite different experimental setups, data, and procedures, the two data models spotted the same new phenomenon that-to give both Ting and Richter their due-became known with the double name of J/ψ particle. The new phenomenon was unobservable: its existence was not justified by facts concerning human perception, but rather by its being a robust feature emerging from different kinds of data, reliably selected and analysed through different experimental procedures.
The ratio R in Richter's data model worked at the interface between experimental data and theoretical entities (quarks): it gave the probability of experimental outcomes on the basis of the information supplied by the background quark theory, which defined the array of possible expectation values for R. The values for R as of July 1974 ranged from 0.36 to ∞ depending on which model of the quark theory was endorsed (Table 1) . According to the most plausible model at the time (with only three quarks u, d, s), the expected value for R was 2. But it turned out to be of the order of 10/3 as predicted by the quark model with a fourth quark c (charm) with charge 2/3:
which multiplied by a colour factor of 3 gives 10/3 as found in Richter's data model. Thus, the new phenomenon that appeared in Richter's data model already pointed to the most plausible candidate (Gell-Mann-Zweig quark model with charm) from among all candidates in Table 1 . This is what I have called the upward path for the introduction of theoretical entities: they enter already in the array of expectation values for the parameter that the data model is meant to measure. Nature takes its rightful toll only by pointing to one (eventually unexpected) value from among all the theoretically allowed ones.
Richter's and Ting's data models experimentally overdetermined the existence of a very narrow resonance at 3.1 GeV. There was still a long way to go from the J/ψ to its identification with a bound state of the charm quark and of its antiquark. The main stumbling block towards 'saving' the new phenomenon was the very narrow width of the resonance. This was determined with accuracy from the area included under the peak via the following equation:
where σ i is the total cross-section for the production of a final state i, B i is the branching fraction to the state i, B e is the branching fraction to an electron-positron state, M is the mass of the state and is its total width. The total width of the resonance was calculated as = 69 ± 13 keV. Now, ordinary hadrons typically display widths of around 20% of their masses. So, given the heavy mass of 3.1 GeV, one would expect a much broader width for the J/ψ, and hence a much shorter lifetime. The search for a theoretical model able to save this puzzling feature of the new phenomenon began. In the following section, I present a summary of some theoretical models proposed in the early months of 1975 to save the new phenomenon.
How the charmonium model saved the new unobservable phenomenon
4.2.1 The J /ψ as a baryon-antibaryon bound state Alfred Goldhaber and Maurice Goldhaber ([1975] ) interpreted the J/ψ as a baryon-antibaryon bound state (more precisely, as a + − system, 14 whose lower state would be bound and the upper would be a resonance). Since the mass of the particle is around 1.6 GeV, a bound state of two particles could 'save' the mass of 3.1 GeV. Moreover, the high strangeness quantum number of the particle could account for the long lifetime of the J/ψ. 15 However, this model could not save the puzzling narrow width: baryon-antibaryon bound states typically have broad bumps whose widths are as small as a few MeV (by contrast with the measured 69 keV of the J /ψ).
14
The particle, experimentally detected in 1964, is a baryon (i.e., a particle with heavy mass) consisting in a s quark triplet (sss), and having strangeness quantum number S = 3.
15
Particles with high strangeness typically have a long lifetime because they cannot decay by strong or electromagnetic interactions since this would violate the strangeness conservation law; whereas they can decay by weak interactions because this conservation law does not apply to weak interactions.
4.2.2
The J /ψ as the spin-1 meson of a model with three charmed quarks R. Michael Barnett ([1975] ) proposed a model with six quarks, where the first three quarks were supposed to carry the flavour 'charm' C = 0, and the last three C = 1. Barnett identified the J /ψ with a spin-1 meson consisting of a mixture of a fourth-not yet discovered-quark charm (postulated by the Glashow-Iliopoulos-Maiani theory, see next subsection) and of a hypothetical fifth quark. In so doing, the J /ψ was allowed to decay into a pair of charmed (i.e., carrying a non-zero value for C) pions by a mechanism involving the creation of a heavy/light quark-antiquark pair. But this process was forbidden by energy conservation. As Barnett recognized, 'the very narrow width of the observed resonance leads us to infer that [this] decay [. . .] is not allowed' (ibid., p. 41).
4.2.3
The J /ψ as a charmonium state Thomas Appelquist and H. David Politzer ([1975] ) identified the new particle with a bound state (called charmonium) of the long-sought fourth quark charm c and of its anti-quark c (having parallel spin and null angular momentum), whose existence had been predicted in 1970 by the Glashow-Iliopoulos-Maiani (GIM) theory ([1970] ) to explain strangenesschanging weak neutral currents. 16 The Appelquist-Politzer model of the J /ψ as a charmonium state offered the first indirect evidence for the quark charm. 17 A closer look at the physical details of the charmonium model can help us appreciate the role of the quark c in designing the empirical substructures responsible for the model being able to save the new phenomenon at 3.1 GeV.
The model could save the new phenomenon because its empirical substructures included (1) the total cross-section σ for J /ψ production in SPEAR electron-positron collisions; and (2) the J/ψ hadronic and muonic decay widths h and l . Crucially, the quark mass matrices m (with m u , m d , m s < 1 GeV and m c > 1 GeV) enter into the renormalized perturbation expansion of the total cross-section. The non-Abelian structure 16 These are weak-interaction phenomena that do not change the charge but the strangeness. An example is the decay of the neutral kaon into a pair of muons K 0 → µ + µ − , where the total charge is conserved while the strangeness S drops from +1 to 0. The existence of such currents was allowed by the Cabibbo theory, but it was observed to occur very rarely. According to Cabibbo's theory, the d and s quark states at work in weak interactions were not pure flavour eigenstates (like the u quark), but a mixture resulting from a rotation through the Cabibbo angle θ c (i.e., d cos θ c + s sin θ c ). The GIM theory could account for the rarity of this phenomenon by introducing a fourth quark c, with electric charge 2/3 and carrying a new flavour, the charm. This resulted in another quark doublet with the pure flavour eigenstate c, and the d and s quark mixture orthogonal to the aforementioned one (i.e., s cos θ c − d sin θ c ), hence the S = 1 neutral currents cancelled out. (Richter [1977] ). of the model (i.e., including quark self-interactions) implied breakdowns of the perturbation expansion both above and below the value 4m 2 c . And it was the breakdown below 4m 2 c that was responsible for the formation of charmonium states, that is, for the formation of the J/ψ from electron-positron collisions.
Furthermore, the quark charm mass matrix m c enters in the calculation of the hadronic decay width h , of the muonic decay width l , and hence in the ratio h / l . The calculated ratio h / l turned out to fit Richter's data model (Figures 1(a) and 1(c) ). More precisely, it turned out to fit the unexpected measured value of 10/3 for R (the fit was not exact, but in the right direction).
The energetically allowed decay of the J/ψ particle into (uncharmed) hadrons involved a very slow mechanism (typical of strong interactions) with the annihilation of the charm quark-antiquark pair and its conversion into a light quark-antiquark pair. This accounted for the unexpectedly long lifetime of the J/ψ. The charmonium model gave the empirically most adequate treatment of the new unobservable phenomenon. And its ability to save it can be ultimately traced back to its empirical substructures being designed by including the quark c mass contribution, suitably featured in compliance with some important theoretical constraints (from energy conservation in the decay modes, to renormalizability in the perturbation expansion of the total cross-section).
Concluding Remarks
I have delved into the history of charmonium because I think it sheds some interesting light on the process of saving unobservable phenomena. Unobservable phenomena have a special epistemological status. Saving unobservable phenomena is a two-way stretching process between the data model and the theoretical model; and, theoretical entities play an important role in it. They enter bottom-up in the unexpected measured value for a parameter in the data model and top-down (from a pre-existing and independently introduced scientific theory, e.g., GIM) in the theoretical model that turns out to fit the unexpected value in the data model. It is the serendipitous convergence of these two opposite paths that makes it possible to save a new unobservable phenomenon. Thus, saving unobservable phenomena is not a straight one-way fit to data models as an empirically rockbottom ground. It resembles instead the selective processes of evolutionary biology, where creatures and niches evolve together and adapt to each other via symbiotic strategies: theoretical entities and experimental data evolve together, and together come to be selected in the theoretical model that turns out to save the data model.
Going back to the mild Kantian form of realism I mentioned above, I hope we can now start appreciating how and why there is more to saving phenomena that the empiricist tradition may imply. 'Saving unobservable phenomena' is the serendipitous result of combining data-selected and constructed into a data model-with theoretical entities-suitably featuring in a theoretical model. What kind of phenomena we can save depends both on how reliable the data are and on how adequately we construct them into a salvageable data model. The first aim of this paper was to advertise these experimental practices. Its second aim was to underline the constructivist component in them.
